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A REAL-WORLD ANALYSIS OF PHARMACEUTICAL
SETTLEMENTS: THE MISSING DIMENSION OF PRODUCT
HOPPING
Michael A. Carrier*
Abstract
The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in improving
human health. But it also provides the setting for some of the most
concerning issues in the patent-antitrust intersection today. Two activities
are particularly worrisome.
First, brand-name pharmaceutical firms and generic companies have
settled patent litigation. As part of these agreements, brand firms have paid
generic firms to drop their patent challenges and delay entering the market.
Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have
engaged in “product hopping,” often switching from one means of
administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule).
In the past decade, courts and commentators have separately explored
these activities. But no one has yet explored the intersection of these two
forms of conduct. This Article tackles this project. In doing so, it uncovers
a vital strategy that, until now, has fallen through the cracks of antitrust
law.
This Article will show that the combination of settlements and product
hopping results in unrecognized, anticompetitive harm. Such a conclusion
is particularly important given arguments offered by settling parties today,
which on the surface appear reasonable. These parties have contended that
settlements that allow entry before the end of the patent term are, by
definition, procompetitive. After all, such entry would appear to introduce
competition before patent expiration. This would seem to be a significant
justification for the settlement.
But the closer analysis presented here reveals anticompetitive effects
arising from the combination of settlement and product hopping. For a
settlement that prevents patent challenges for a period of time—even if less
than the duration of the patent—gives the brand firm the space in which it
can comfortably switch the market to the new product. So by the time,
years later, when the generic enters, the market will have already been
switched to the new product. The generic firm will no longer be able to
take advantage of state drug product selection laws that allow pharmacists
to automatically substitute generic drugs in place of brand-name drugs. In
short, the lethal combination of the two activities erects a significant
roadblock to pharmaceutical competition.
* Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden. I would like to thank Meredyth
Andrus, Pat Cafferty, and Steve Shadowen for helpful comments and Karalee Monahan for
excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The pharmaceutical industry plays an important role in improving
human health. But it also provides the setting for some of the most
concerning issues in the patent-antitrust intersection today. Two activities
are particularly worrisome.
First, brand-name drug firms and generic companies have settled patent
litigation. As part of these agreements, brand firms have paid generic firms
to drop their patent challenges and delay entering the market.
Second, drug companies, frequently at the end of patent terms, engage
in “product hopping,” often switching from one means of administering the
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drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule).
In the past decade, courts and commentators have separately explored
these activities. But no one has yet explored the intersection of these two
forms of conduct. This Article tackles this project. In doing so, it uncovers
a vital strategy that, until now, has fallen through the cracks of antitrust
law.
This Article will show that the combination of settlements and product
hopping results in anticompetitive harm. Such a conclusion is particularly
important given arguments offered by settling parties today, which on the
surface appear reasonable. These parties have contended that settlements
that allow entry before the end of the patent term are, by definition,
procompetitive. After all, such entry would seem to introduce competition
before patent expiration. This would appear to be a significant justification
for the settlement.
But the closer analysis presented here reveals the anticompetitive
effects arising from the combination of settlement and product hopping.
For a settlement that prevents patent challenges for a period of time—even
if less than the duration of the patent—gives the brand firm the space in
which it can comfortably switch the market to the new product. By the
time, years later, when the generic enters, the market will have already
been switched to the new product. As a result, the generic firm, which can
no longer take advantage of state drug product selection laws, fails to
provide meaningful competition.
Part II of this Article sets the stage. It first presents an overview of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which governs patent settlements in the
pharmaceutical industry. It pays particular attention to the timing of generic
entry in relation to the patent term. It then defines product hopping and
focuses on the effect of state drug product selection laws, which allow
pharmacists to automatically substitute generic for brand versions of drugs.
This section also highlights the “price disconnect,” by which doctors
prescribing medications do not directly consider the drug’s price.
Part III presents a case study of the combined effect of settlements and
product hopping. The drug Provigil, a sleep disorder medication, reveals
Cephalon’s combination of the two practices. This company settled with
the first four generic firms to challenge the patent, allowing entry several
years before the expiration of the patent term. Such entry, however, was
designed to occur after Cephalon switched the market to the new product,
Nuvigil.
Part IV presents a second study, of AndroGel, a testosterone gel
replacement. In this case, manufacturer Solvay settled with generic firms,
again allowing entry before the end of the patent term, but again garnering
enough breathing room to—without any concern of patent challenges—
switch from one version of the gel to a second.1
1. Nor are the cases limited to the United States. In the European Commission’s recent

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 6

1012

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

Part V adds the product-hopping dimension to the analysis of drug
settlements, which until now has neglected this element. Courts and
commentators in recent years have focused on the appropriate treatment of
reverse payments in drug settlements. But once the focus expands to
consider the brand firm’s overall strategy, the framework shifts.
Without considering the brand firm’s product hopping, the settlement
framework resembles one in which 1) the brand firm maintains its
monopoly, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which
generics enter the market, fostering competition.
Adding the product-hopping dimension shifts the framework to one in
which 1) the brand firm ensures that its patent will not be challenged,
followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which generic
competition will mean little given the migration of patients to a new
product not subject to state drug product selection laws.
A focus on the product-hopping dimension of drug firms’ strategies
uncovers the lethal combination of guaranteed immunity from challenge
and a lack of meaningful competition after generic entry.
II. BACKGROUND
To understand brand firms’ strategy of combining settlements and
product hopping, a separate explanation of the two would be useful. This
Part thus provides a brief overview of drug settlements, paying special
attention to the timing of generic entry. It then discusses product hopping,
focusing on the state drug product selection laws, which dramatically
increase generic competition but which frequently are the target of product
hopping.
A. Settlements
1. Hatch-Waxman Act
The framework governing drug patent settlements is the HatchWaxman Act,2 enacted by Congress in 1984 to increase generic
competition and foster innovation in the pharmaceutical industry.3
report on the pharmaceutical industry, product hopping played a potential role in 108 of the 207
reported brand-generic settlements. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY
FINAL REPORT 365 (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_
working_paper_part1.pdf. Although such figures have not been compiled in the United States, the
phenomenon seems to have increased in recent years, as judged by the activity in complaints filed
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), see, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive Relief, FTC v.
Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-00244 (JDB) (D.D.C. 2008) [hereinafter Cephalon Complaint], and by
conversations with FTC officials about trends in recent filings under the Medicare Modernization
Act.
2. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
3. Teresa Stanek Rea, Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug Price
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One central goal of the Act was to promote generic competition.4
Generic drugs have the same active ingredients, dosage, administration,
performance, and safety as patented brand drugs.5 Despite the equivalence,
generic manufacturers were required, at the time of the Act, to engage in
lengthy and expensive trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.6 The
FDA approval process took several years, and because the required tests
constituted infringement, generics could not begin the process during the
patent term.7 They therefore waited until the end of the term to begin these
activities, which prevented them from entering the market until two or
three years after the patent’s expiration.8 At the time Congress enacted
Hatch-Waxman, there was no generic equivalent for roughly 150 drugs
whose patent terms had lapsed.9
In the Act, Congress employed several mechanisms to encourage
competition. First, it allowed firms to experiment on the drug during the
patent term. In particular, the legislature exempted from infringement the
manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention for uses “reasonably
related to the development and submission of information” under a federal
law regulating the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.10
Second, Congress created a new process for obtaining FDA approval.
Before Hatch-Waxman, generic firms that offered products identical to
approved drugs needed to independently prove safety and efficacy.11 One
reason that generic companies chose not to bring products to the market
after a patent’s expiration was the expense and time involved in replicating
clinical studies.12 The Act created a new type of drug application, called an
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), that allowed generic firms to
rely on brands’ safety and effectiveness studies, dispensing with the need
for lengthy and expensive independent preclinical or clinical studies.13
Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act—An Introduction of Speakers, 54 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 223, 224 (1999).
4. For a discussion of the mechanisms used to carry out the other primary goal, fostering
innovation, see Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 43–45 (2009) (discussing patent term extensions,
non-patent market exclusivity, and an automatic 30-month stay of FDA approval of generics).
5. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Generic Drugs: What You Need to Know,
http://www.fda.gov/buyonlineguide/generics_q&a.htm (last visited May 7, 2010).
6. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 43–44 (1998).
7. Id. at 38.
8. Id.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006).
11. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 589–90 (2003).
12. See id.
13. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 5 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [hereinafter
GENERIC DRUG STUDY].
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Most relevant for our purposes, the Act provided 180 days of marketing
exclusivity to the first generic firm to certify that the brand firm’s patent
was not valid or that the generic’s drug did not infringe the patent.14 Such
exclusivity was reserved for the first generic firm—known as a “Paragraph
IV filer”—that sought to enter during the patent term.15 During the period,
which begins after the first commercial marketing of the drug, the FDA
cannot approve other ANDAs for the same product.16
2. Antitrust Concern
This exclusivity has resulted in numerous settlements between brand
firms and first-filing generic companies. By paying the first-filer to delay
entering the market, the brand firm can prevent entry not only by that
generic but also by all other generics. The reason is that these firms cannot
enter the market until 180 days after the first-filer’s entry.17 And as a result
of the settlement with the brand firm, the generics’ entry is delayed for
years.
It is in the interest of both the brand firm and the first-filing generic
firm to settle, especially with payments from the brand to the generic
known as “reverse payments.”18 The brand firm benefits by blocking
challenges that could invalidate its patent. And the generic company
receives a subset of the brand firm’s monopoly profits that may even
exceed what it could have gained through successful litigation and market
entry. Consumers, on the other hand, suffer from the stifling of challenges
to patents that often are invalid.19
At the same time, subsequent generic filers have not played a
meaningful role in challenging those settlements. Even if they prove the
patent’s invalidity, that would only trigger the first-filer’s 180 days of
exclusivity. In addition, if the brand firm does not sue later-filing generic
firms, these generics may not be able to obtain a judicial determination of
the validity of the brand firm’s patent given the difficulties of obtaining
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
15. Id. Three other patent certifications apply if the drug is not patented, the patent has
expired, or the generic agrees it will not seek approval until the patent expires. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006).
16. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 13, at 7. Until amended in 2003, the Hatch-Waxman
Act included a court decision finding invalidity or lack of infringement as a second trigger for the
start of the 180-day period. Erika Lietzan & David E. Korn, Issues in the Interpretation of 180-Day
Exclusivity, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 49, 63 (2007).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
18. These agreements are called reverse payments since they differ from typical licensing
payments that flow from challengers to patentees. See Carrier, supra note 4, at 39.
19. In a study of Paragraph IV challenges between 1992 and 2000, the FTC found that the
generic prevailed in 73% of the patent infringement cases and that the brand-name companies won
only 27% of the time. GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 13, at 16. These figures are consistent with
a survey of Federal Circuit decisions from 2002 through 2004 that found that pharmaceutical
patentees were successful on the merits in 30% of the cases. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who
Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 20 (2006).
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declaratory judgment.
Most generally, the parties’ reverse-payment settlements threaten severe
anticompetitive dangers. They are a type of market division, with the brand
firm blocking all competition for a period of time.20 Market division,
which antitrust courts view as per se illegal,21 is concerning because it
restricts all competition between the parties on all grounds.
Not all patent settlements, to be sure, constitute market allocation
agreements. If a patent is valid and infringed, the patentee could rely on the
patent itself to restrict competition. In that case, an agreement that allows a
generic to enter before the end of the patent term could increase
competition. But if a patent is invalid or not infringed, there is no
legitimate justification for delaying competition.
The appropriate antitrust treatment of patent settlements thus depends
on the validity of the patent and existence of infringement. But the most
straightforward way to determine these issues, patent litigation, is not
appropriate in this setting. Determining patent validity and infringement
would require significant analysis and testimony on complex issues such as
patent claim interpretation and infringement analysis. Such inquiries,
which could take weeks, cannot be inserted as mini-trials within antitrust
cases.22
3. Timing of Generic Entry
One central element of settlements has been the timing of generic entry.
Most generally (and oversimplifying dramatically), the longer the generic
firm agrees to refrain from entering the market, the more concern arises.
Anticompetitive effects are highest if the generic firm agrees not to enter
during the entire patent term. In contrast, generic entry before the end of a
valid patent term encourages competition within the term, which benefits
consumers.
In some of the early settlements, the generic company agreed to stay out
of the market for all or nearly all of the patent term. For example, in In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation,23 generic firm Barr agreed in 1993
not to enter the market with a generic breast cancer treatment until brand
firm Zeneca’s patent expired in 2002.24 And in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,25 brand firm Bayer in 1997 paid
20. In re Schering-Plough Corp., 2003 WL 22989651, Part II.A (F.T.C. 2003), vacated by
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005).
21. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam).
22. In addition, an analysis of the merits of the patent infringement case would be unreliable.
After a case settles, the parties’ interests become aligned, with a generic firm lacking the incentive
to vigorously attack a patent’s validity or an infringement claim.
23. 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
24. Id. at 193–94.
25. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’g, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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generic firm Barr to stay out of the market until six months before Bayer’s
patent on Cipro, a drug treating bacterial illnesses, expired in 2003.26
In recent settlements, however, such as those concerning Provigil and
AndroGel,27 the parties have provided for generic entry for longer periods
before the end of the term. They presumably have reached such
arrangements to convince courts that the agreements are procompetitive.
After all, the argument goes, the brand firm could, relying on its patent
alone, prevent competition until the end of the patent. In that context,
several years of competition before expiration appear procompetitive.
Cephalon, for example, touted the “obvious benefits and efficiencies” of its
Provigil settlement,28 which “permitted the [g]enerics to enter the market
three years prior to the expiration of the . . . patent.”29
Even Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney, in her answers to
questions for her confirmation hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, remarked that “A patent holder who enters into a commercial
arrangement to allow a competitor to enter the market prior to the patent’s
expiration would most likely be procompetitive.”30
While such a position could conceivably apply in the context of the
patent that is the focus of settlement,31 a closer look at a separate
dimension uncovers potentially significant flaws in the argument.
B. Product Hopping
1. Definition
The new dimension revealed in this Article is “product hopping.” This
activity (also known as “evergreening” or “line extension”) refers to a drug
company’s reformulation of its product. There are several types of such
redesigns.
One type involves new forms, which consist of reformulations from
capsules, tablets, or solutions to other forms, such as any of the above as
well as extended-release drugs and chewable tablets.32 Another type
involves changing molecule parts (known as “moieties”) by adding or
26. Id. at 1328–29.
27. See infra Parts II–III.
28. This settlement is described below. See infra Part III.
29. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss at 1, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-cv00244).
30. Stephen Albainy-Jenei, FTC Position on Reverse Payments: Settlements Can Be
Procompetitive, PATENT BARISTAS, May 13, 2009, http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2009/05/
13/ftc-position-on-reverse-payments-settlements-can-be-procompetitive/ (italicization formatting
removed).
31. Even this position is more nuanced than explained in the text. See infra note 151.
32. Keith Leffler et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41
RUTGERS L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24, on file with author).
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removing compounds.33 A third is a combination of two or more drug
compositions that had previously been marketed separately.34
There are numerous examples of these reformulations.35 For example,
the makers of the antidepressant Prozac and the cholesterol treatment
TriCor switched from capsule to tablet form, while anxiety-treating Buspar
was switched from tablet to capsule.36
Chemical changes explained the switch from allergy medication
Claritin to Clarinex, antidepressant Celexa to Lexapro, and heartburn
medications Prevacid to Kapidex and Prilosec to Nexium.37
Combinations of drugs occurred with migraine-treatment Treximet
(combining Imitrex and Naproxen Sodium) and high-blood-pressure
medications Azor (Norvasc and Benicar), Caduet (Norvasc and Lipitor),
and Exforge (Norvasc and Diovan).38
Much of this product-hopping activity has been successful because it
has avoided the effect of state drug product selection laws.
2. State Drug Product Selection Laws
State drug product selection (DPS) laws, in effect in all fifty states
today, are designed to lower prices for consumers. These laws allow—and
in many cases require—pharmacists, absent a doctor’s contrary
instructions, to substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions.
DPS laws are designed to address the disconnect in the industry
between prescribing doctors, who are not directly responsive to drug
pricing, and paying insurers and consumers, who do not directly select the
prescribed drug.39 In particular, DPS laws carve out a role for pharmacists,
who are much more sensitive to prices than doctors.40
Doctors are subject to a vast array of drug promotion, which includes
detailing (sales calls to doctor’s offices), direct mailings, free drug
samples, medical journal advertising, sponsored continuing medical
education programs, and media advertising.41 Pharmacists, in contrast,
33. Id. (manuscript at 24–25).
34. Id. (manuscript at 25) (discussing, as well, enantiomers, molecules that are mirror images
of each other).
35. See Rebecca S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The
Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL. 379, 388 (2007) (“[S]ixty percent
of New Drug Applications submitted to the FDA in the 1990s were for drugs containing existing
active ingredients.”).
36. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 36, 42).
37. Id. (manuscript at 31–32).
38. Id. (manuscript at 25, 40).
39. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT TO THE
FTC 2–3 (1979).
40. ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS 7 (1985).
41. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87–93 (2d ed. 2007).
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respond to consumer demand and compete with other pharmacies on
price.42
Reformulation eliminates both price and quality competition. It
eliminates quality competition since the brand firm switches its promotion
to the new product, leaving doctors unable to effectively compare quality
between the reformulated brand drug and the old version.43 It also limits
price competition because it evades the DPS laws.44
The DPS laws typically allow pharmacists to substitute generic versions
of brand drugs only if they are “AB-rated” by the FDA. To receive an AB
rating, a generic drug must be therapeutically equivalent to the brand drug,
which means that the generic has the same active ingredient, form, dosage,
strength, and safety and efficacy profile.45 The drug also must be
bioequivalent, which signifies that the rate and extent of absorption in the
body is roughly equivalent to the brand drug.46
The concern when a brand reformulates its drug is that the generic
version of the first product is not bioequivalent to the second product. And
while the generic firm may eventually show bioequivalence, such a
showing likely will not occur for years. There are several reasons for the
delay.
First, the generic manufacturer must reformulate its product. This
period is extended because the brand firm does not need to provide notice
to the generic firm of the reformulation.47 Second, the generic firm must
seek FDA approval (which typically takes at least eighteen months) for this
new version.48 And third, in many cases, the generic firm will file a
Paragraph-IV certification, which is followed by the brand firm’s
automatic “thirty month stay” of FDA approval and additional delays from
patent litigation.49 As a result of these delays, the pharmacist is not able to
substitute the generic version of the old product for the brand version of
the new product.50
42. See MASSON & STEINER, supra note 40, at 7.
43. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 3) (“We examine the economic effect . . . with
special emphasis on identifying the particular dimension of rivalry—price competition or quality
comparisons—that is affected.”).
44. Id. (manuscript at 17–18).
45. FDA Center For Drug Evaluation and Research, Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (30th ed.), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapproval
process/ucm079068.htm (last visited May 8, 2010) [hereinafter Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations]; Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 5).
46. See Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, supra note 45.
47. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 6).
48. LEON SHARGEL & ISADORE KANFER, GENERIC DRUG PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 366 (2005).
49. Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1488–89, 1489 n.107 (2008). The period could extend an additional
twelve months depending on when the generic filed its Paragraph IV certification. 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006); see generally C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1566 n.50 (2006).
50. Cheng, supra note 49, at 487–88.
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Compounding this problem—and as discussed in detail below in the
setting of the Provigil case—the brand firm typically will switch its
promotional efforts to the new drug. In fact, it will often highlight the
advantages of the new product as compared to the old.51 At the same time,
no other party has the incentive and ability to promote the old product,
which leads to doctors receiving “an entirely one-sided presentation” of the
relative merits of the products.52 The case of Abbott Laboratories v. Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. reveals the dangers of product hopping for
generic substitution.53
3. Generic Substitution Case
The drug at the center of Abbott Laboratories was TriCor, a billiondollar drug used to lower cholesterol and triglycerides.54 In 1998, Abbott
received FDA approval of its capsule version of TriCor. During the next
two years, two generic firms filed ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications
challenging TriCor. In 2003, the generic firms received favorable
judgments in litigation. In the intervening period, however, Abbott had
marginally lowered the drug’s strength and switched from a capsule form
of the drug to a tablet form. These changes prevented pharmacists from
substituting generic versions of TriCor.
Abbott took direct aim at this regime with its plan to switch to a new
version of TriCor. Not only did it switch to a tablet form, but it 1) stopped
selling capsules; 2) bought back the existing supplies of the capsules from
the pharmacies; and 3) changed the code for TriCor capsules in the
National Drug Data File (NDDF)55 to obsolete.56 As the district court
observed, these activities “prevented pharmacies from filling TriCor
prescriptions with a generic capsule formulation.”57
The generic firms then developed equivalents for the tablet formulation
and submitted ANDAs with Paragraph IV certifications. Abbott sued and
transitioned to a new type of tablet, marked by, again, marginally lower
strength. And again, Abbott stopped selling the old TriCor tablets and
changed the NDDF code on these tablets to obsolete.

51. See infra Part III.
52. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 45) (explaining that other brands lack the
incentive to promote a competitor’s products and that generics will not promote the product because
they do not have large sales forces and would worry about free-riding by other generics).
53. 432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006).
54. The facts are taken from id. at 415–18.
55. The NDDF, which guides pharmacists in determining substitution, is “a comprehensive
set of drug data base elements, drug pricing and clinical information.” First DataBank, National
Drug Data File (NDDF) Plus, http://www.firstdatabank.com/Products/national-drug-fileNDDF.aspx (last visited May 10, 2010).
56. Abbott, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
57. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 6

1020

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

The district court applied a rule-of-reason approach in denying Abbott’s
motion to dismiss. It found that Abbott allegedly prevented a choice
between products “by removing the old formulations from the market
while introducing new formulations.”58 The court also found that through
Abbott’s “allegedly manipulative and unjustifiable formulation changes,”
Teva and Impax were not able to offer generic substitutes for TriCor,
which was the alleged “cost-efficient means of competing” in the market.59
In short, the DPS laws, which play a central role in containing
prescription drug pricing in all fifty states, were directly threatened by
Abbott’s activity. The activity reveals the role that product hopping plays
in evading the state drug product selection laws.
4. Timing of Reformulation
Product hopping is most successful when brand firms can not only
avoid state DPS laws but also orchestrate effective timing. Stated most
simply, the brand firm will be more successful if it can switch the market
before generic entry.
Introducing the new product before the generic enters the market “adds
the near-elimination of price competition to the near-elimination of quality
competition.”60 Brand firms offer the “uncontested message” of the new
product’s superiority as the manufacturer’s detailers “extol the virtues of
the new product” at a time that “no one is promoting the original.”61 In
addition, brand firms make the switch “when doctors do not have a generic
alternative available and do not know that one may be on the way.”62
Several examples demonstrate the crucial role played by timing. In the
TriCor case, one document demonstrated the different projected sales
based on timing. The brand firm, Abbott, predicted that if it launched its
reformulated version before generic entry, sales would rise from 161
million Euros in 2004 to 269 million Euros in 2008.63 But if the
reformulation did not reach the market before the generic, sales would only
reach 35 million Euros in 2004 and 15 million Euros in 2008.64 In other
words, in 2008, sales would be more than 17 times greater if Abbott
introduced the new version before generic entry.

58. Id. at 422.
59. Id. at 423. The case ultimately settled. See, e.g., Seth Silber & Kara Kuritz, Product
Switching in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Ripe for Antitrust Scrutiny?, 7 J. GENERIC MEDS. 119,
123 (2010).
60. Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 50).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical
Industry 6 (2009) (unpublished presentation, on file with author), available at
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-hcic/pdf/past-programs/10-28-09-shadowen.pdf.
64. Id.
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Another example revealed by Keith Leffler, Joseph Lukens, and Steve
Shadowen involved a confidential analysis of a product for which
projected sales in the first three years after generic entry would be nearly
three times higher if the reformulation (replacing a twice-daily version with
one taken once a day) occurred before generic entry than after.65 Similar
testimony in a different case referred to the launch of a reformulated
product after generic entry as a “[t]otal [d]isaster.”66
The importance of timing also was recognized by the Final Report of
the European Commission, which addressed obstacles blocking generic
entry.67 The report concluded that brands would suffer reduced sales and
prices if generics entered the market before or at the same time as the
follow-on product.68 For that reason, “[I]t is of [the] utmost importance for
the originator company to bring the follow-on product on the market before
the first product effectively loses exclusivity.”69
The brand firm facilitates such a switch by “channelling . . . demand
from the first product to the follow-on product” and by “delay[ing] or
prevent[ing] generic entry for the sensitive period of the product switch.”70
For 13 of the 22 second-generation products in the report, the new product
was launched before the first lost its exclusivity, with an average lead time
of 17 months.71
The report included several telling comments from drug companies.
One brand firm explained that “the switch rate is dramatically reduced” if
generics enter at the time of, or before, the second-generation product.72
Similarly, as another brand company revealed: “[E]ach patient that is not
switched quickly enough” to the second-generation product “is forever lost
to the generics.”73 In contrast, as a third brand firm conceded: “Once the
patient is switched to [the new product] the physician does not have to,
cannot and will not switch him to a generic, and . . . more important: the
pharmacist cannot substitute!!”74
In short, the timing of reformulation matters significantly. Brand firms
have a considerable interest in forestalling generic entry until after they can
switch the market to the new product. Such a delay protects them from
selling and marketing their branded drugs against cheaper generics. The
next two parts of the Article, discussing the drugs Provigil and AndroGel,
demonstrate how brand firms have used settlements to ensure that generic
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 356.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 361 fig.138. The Report considered patent and data exclusivity. Id. at 22–23.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 360.
Id.
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entry does not occur before they can switch the market to the reformulated
product.
III. CASE STUDY 1: PROVIGIL
A. Facts
The case of Provigil is the most vivid example of the interplay of
settlements and product hopping. Provigil is a sleep-disorder medication
marketed by Cephalon. It was initially approved for excessive daytime
sleepiness associated with narcolepsy and was subsequently used to treat
obstructive sleep apnea and shift work sleep disorder.75 U.S. soldiers, most
famously those fighting in the Iraq War, have used it to stay awake for as
long as 40 hours at a time.76
The drug offers significant benefits over other amphetamine-like
stimulants. In particular, it does not produce side effects such as addiction,
feeling jittery, and crashing afterward.77 As a result, the drug is considered
the “gold standard” for the treatment of the excessive sleepiness
accompanying sleep disorders.78 U.S. sales of Provigil have increased from
$25 million in 1999 to $475 million in 2005 to $800 million in 2007.79
The active ingredient in Provigil is a chemical compound called
modafinil.80 Cephalon filed a New Drug Application for Provigil in 1996,
which the FDA approved in 1998.81 The U.S. patent covering modafinil
was issued in 1979 and expired in 2001.82
Cephalon obtained a second patent in 1997. This patent covered a
formulation of modafinil that consisted of a specified distribution of small
particles.83 This narrower patent lasts until October 2014, with Cephalon
receiving an additional six months of pediatric exclusivity extending
protection to April 2015.84
Unlike the patent on the compound itself, generic firms could, without
difficulty, avoid this narrow formulation patent. As a consultant advised
Cephalon in 2002: “[A]ll generic companies know [that the patent] may be
75. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 26.
76. Tom Spears, New Drug May Help Soldiers Stay Awake Doctors Unsure of Long-Term
Effect, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 11, 2003, http://www.modafinil.com/article/soldiers.html.
77. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 27.
78. Id.
79. Id. ¶ 28.
80. Id. ¶ 24.
81. Id. ¶ 26.
82. Id. ¶ 32.
83. Id. ¶ 33.
84. Press Release, Cephalon, Cephalon Granted Six Months of Pediatric Exclusivity for
Provigil(R), Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml?mode=year&
filterval=2006 (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting that Cephalon “met the terms of a written request
to provide data from clinical studies examining the effect of Provigil in pediatric patients”)
(emphasis omitted).
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easily circumvented” by manufacturing products to contain a different
distribution of modafinil particle sizes.85
Given the ease with which generic firms could circumvent the particlesize patent, it is no surprise they were eager to do so. As the FTC explained
in its complaint: “On December 24, 2002, the first day that the FDA could
accept an ANDA for generic Provigil, four companies submitted
applications . . . .”86 Teva, Ranbaxy, Mylan, and Barr each certified “that
[their] version[s] of generic Provigil did not infringe . . . [the] [p]atent, that
the patent was invalid, or both.”87
Each of the four generic firms developed non-infringing versions of
Provigil.88 And since all four filed on the same day, they could share the
180-day Hatch-Waxman exclusivity period.89
As the FTC pointed out in the complaint: “Cephalon knew that generic
Provigil entry would lead to substantial declines in the company’s
revenues.”90 A Cephalon vice president projected a 75%–90% price
reduction that would lower revenues by more than $400 million (nearly
75% of the drug’s annual sales) within one year.91
The generic firms estimated a similar impact. Teva projected that
generic versions “would garner 90[%] of all modafinil prescriptions within
a month.”92 The price was projected to fall to 5%–10% of Provigil’s price
within one year.93
The generic firms’ claims, in fact, were supported by the consensus in
the industry. Wall Street analysts projected generic entry in 2006.94 The
four first-filing generic firms planned for a launch in June 2006, at the
latest.95 Barr ordered significant quantities of the active ingredient in late
2005.96 And Cephalon asserted, in November 2005, that “generic versions
of modafinil” would enter the market in the middle of 2006.97
Cephalon sought to maintain its market share by introducing a
successor product, Nuvigil, in 2006.98 The longer-lasting Nuvigil was
similar to Provigil in many ways, including chemical composition.99 It
85. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 35.
86. Id. ¶ 36.
87. Id.
88. Id. ¶ 37.
89. Id. ¶ 38.
90. Id. ¶ 39.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶ 40.
93. Id. (noting that Teva projected 10% and Ranbaxy projected 5%).
94. Id. ¶ 51.
95. Id. ¶ 50.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶ 48.
98. Id. ¶ 52.
99. Press Release, Cephalon, Cephalon Receives FDA Approval of NUVIGIL(TM) for the
Treatment of Excessive Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, June 18, 2007,
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offered modest improvements by allowing patients to take a pill once a day
instead of two times daily. Cephalon also sought to switch to Nuvigil to
expand its customer base to cover other conditions.100
The FDA, however, “had not approved Nuvigil by late 2005.”101 And,
as the FTC pointed out, “[T]here was considerable uncertainty as to
whether the FDA would approve Nuvigil early enough in 2006 to enable
Cephalon to successfully migrate customers from Provigil to Nuvigil
before the entry of a generic version of Provigil.”102 Given this uncertainty,
Cephalon decided to settle patent litigation with the four first-filing generic
firms.103
Cephalon paid more than $200 million to the four generic firms to agree
to forgo entry until April 2012.104 The Cephalon CEO conceded that the
settlements provided “six more years of patent protection[,]” which was
“$4 billion in sales that no one expected.”105
B. The Big Picture: Product Hopping and Settlement Interplay
In its motion to dismiss the complaint, which the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently denied,106 Cephalon noted
that the settlement, which allowed entry in 2012, “resulted in generic entry
years earlier than patent expiration” in 2015.107 This is typical of
arguments voiced by proponents of recent reverse-payment settlements,
who justify the agreements by pointing to the guaranteed years of
competition before the end of the patent term.
A bird’s-eye view of the activity, however, shows how the various
forms of anticompetitive behavior fit together. Cephalon had no intention
of competing in a robust market with generic firms in 2012. The generic
firms themselves, in obtaining more than $200 million from Cepahlon, did
not expect vibrant competition in 2012.
http://www.cephalon.com/media/news-releases.shtml?mode=year&filterval=2007 (last visited May
7, 2010) (follow “Cephalon Receives FDA Approval of NUVIGIL(TM) . . .” hyperlink). As the
Cephalon press release points out, “The active pharmaceutical ingredient in Nuvigil, armodafinil, is
the longer-lived r-enantiomer [molecule’s mirror image] of modafinil, the active ingredient in
Provigil.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
100. Cephalon, Inc., Q1 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, May 5, 2009, available at http://seek
ingalpha.com/article/135541-cephalon-inc-q1-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (discussing
clinical trials for jet-lag disorders, bipolar depression, sleep apnea, co-morbid major depressive
disorder, and traumatic brain injury).
101. Cephalon Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 52.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 53.
104. Id. ¶ 3.
105. Id. ¶ 4.
106. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 2010 WL 1221793 (E.D.Pa., Mar. 29,
2010).
107. Defendant Cephalon, Inc.’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss at 26, FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 08-cv00244).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/6

16

Carrier: A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing

2010]

THE MISSING DIMENSION OF PRODUCT HOPPING

1025

Rather, by delaying the potential onset of generic competition until
2012, six years after settlement, Cephalon bought itself a period in which it
was guaranteed that its weak Provigil patent would not be challenged.
With that certainty in hand, Cephalon could enjoy the luxury of an
extended period in which it could switch the market to its new sleepiness
drug, Nuvigil. Nuvigil, which the FDA approved in 2007, enjoys patent
protection until 2023.108
A Cephalon spokesman conceded that after settlement “[t]he pressure is
not what it was” and that the company was not required “to make a quick
transition from Provigil to Nuvigil.”109 And an industry analyst agreed that
the delay would “‘allow Cepahlon to seek to expand its wakefulness
franchise’” rather than treating Nuvigil “‘merely as a conversion
opportunity . . . that would be under pressure to establish itself early.’”110
C. Specific Strategy
1. Make Provigil Less Desirable
Cepahlon’s switching strategy had two simple components: making
Provigil less desirable and making Nuvigil more desirable.111 The easiest
way to make Provigil less desirable was to increase its price. Between 2004
and 2008, Cephalon increased the price of Provigil by 74%.112 As a
Cephalon vice president remarked: “[W]e will likely raise Provigil prices
to try to create an incentive for the reimbursers to preferentially move to
Nuvigil.”113
Another means to reduce Provigil’s attractiveness was to stop
promoting it. And that is what it did. Cephalon officials explained that they
“actually pulled all promotion from Provigil” after the first quarter of 2009
108. Cephalon Receives FDA Approval Of Nuvigil(TM) for the Treatment of Excessive
Sleepiness Associated with Three Disorders, MED. NEWS TODAY, June 19, 2007,
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/printerfriendlynews.php?newsid=74585 (last visited May 7,
2010).
109. Robert Steyer, Cephalon Puts Worries to Rest, THESTREET, Feb. 14, 2006,
http://www.thestreet.com/print/story/10268224.html (last visited May 7, 2010).
110. Id.
111. Another example involving similar strategies was Cephalon’s switch from pain
management drug Actiq to Fentora, a similar drug requiring lower doses. First, Cephalon “increased
the price of Actiq substantially” and “stopped . . . detailing Actiq[.]” Cephalon, Inc., Q4 2006
Earnings Call Transcript, Feb. 12, 2007, available at http://seekingalpha.com/article/26813cephalon-q4-2006-earnings-call-transcript (emphasis omitted). As a result, the market “retract[ed] a
bit[,]” which the firm’s CEO conceded was “probably our own doing.” Id.
Second, it focused its marketing efforts on Fentora. When it had “a chance to talk to the
doctors” about both products, Cephalon “talk[ed] about Fentora.” Id. And it lowered the new drug’s
price, which was “very attractive to physicians” and gave the company’s representatives a favorable
pricing story. Id.
112. Jonathan D. Rockoff, How a Drug Maker Tries to Outwit Generics, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,
2008, at B1.
113. Id.
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“in anticipation of the Nuvigil launch[,]” which occurred in June.114
Specifically, Cephalon pulled all samples, promotional materials, and
messaging on Provigil in order to replace them with new materials and
samples on Nuvigil.115 A Cephalon official highlighted the firm’s efforts
for Nuvigil, which included “promotional efforts[,] . . . patient sampling
programs, discount programs for patients, a significant number of key
opinion leader/speaker presentations, and a contracting plan with certain
health care payers.”116
2. Make Nuvigil More Desirable
Having weakened the competitive position of Provigil, Cepahlon set off
on its second task: promoting Nuvigil. The CEO sang Nuvigil’s praises:
“With an extensive clinical program supporting Nuvigil, and a patent that
extends to 2023, we believe that Nuvigil will be a very successful product
that will ultimately benefit more patients than Provigil.”117
The company vigorously promoted Nuvigil. As soon as Cephalon
brought Nuvigil to the market, “close to 800 salespeople [would] be out
there” selling it.118 And more:
• “[I]t’s really all focused now on Nuvigil and the
launch of that product and doing absolutely everything
we can to ensure that physicians have a good
experience in prescribing it and that it’s available to
patients and that they have a terrific experience when
they take it.”119
• “We are going to be launching this product, doing so
very vigorously. We believe that Nuvigil is a better
product than Provigil.”120
Bringing it all together was the “excitement” in the marketplace from
the cheaper, “more effective” Nuvigil. Revealing all too little of its role in
increasing Provigil’s price, Cephalon played coy in being “particularly
pleased to offer Nuvigil at a discount to Provigil.”121 A Cepahlon official
explained that Nuvigil’s pricing at a discount has “generated a lot of
114. Cepahlon Q1 2009 Transcript, supra note 100 (emphasis omitted).
115. Cephalon, Inc., Q2 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, Aug. 4, 2007, available at http://seek
ingalpha.com/article/153789-cephalon-inc-q2-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1.
116. Id.
117. Cephalon, Inc., Q4 2008 Earnings Call Transcript, Feb. 13, 2009, available at http://seek
ingalpha.com/article/120423-cephalon-inc-q4-2008-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (emphasis
omitted).
118. Cepahlon Q1 2009 transcript, supra note 100.
119. Id. (emphasis omitted).
120. Id. (emphasis omitted).
121. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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excitement[,] . . . [with] [t]he formularies and the physicians and
pharmacists and bean counters that we’re talking to . . . all see[ing] the
economic benefit that Nuvigil will be able to provide.”122
Of course, given Provigil’s methodically-increasing costs and the
guaranteed lack of generic entry until 2012, it was only natural that
insurers and health-plan managers would switch patients to Nuvigil.
Cephalon should not have been surprised with Nuvigil’s price advantage.
In short, Cephalon’s switch from Provigil to Nuvigil, undertaken in the
context of its settlement with four generic firms that were no longer able to
challenge its Provigil patent, raises concern regarding the anticompetitive
effect of the intersection of product hopping and settlement.
IV. CASE STUDY 2: ANDROGEL
A second case study is presented by the testosterone-replacement drug
AndroGel.
A. Facts
Solvay is the maker of AndroGel, a testosterone gel applied daily to the
skin.123 AndroGel treats low testosterone, a deficiency that may cause
fatigue, decreased sexual function, and depressed mood.124 There is no cure
for low testosterone; instead, it is a medical condition that requires ongoing
treatment.125
AndroGel has been Solvay’s highest-selling product. AndroGel sales in
the United States have risen from $26 million in 2000 to $277 million in
2003 to more than $400 million in 2007.126 From 2000 to 2007,
AndroGel’s cumulative U.S. sales exceeded $1.8 billion.127
AndroGel’s strong sales figures belie limited patent protection.
Testosterone, the active ingredient in AndroGel, has been available in drug
products since the 1950s.128 Patents for synthesizing artificial testosterone
expired decades ago.129 Nonetheless, in 2000, Solvay applied for a patent
covering the use of a gel formulation containing testosterone and other

122. Id.; see also Rockoff, supra note 112 (quoting national medical director for Aetna
Pharmacy Management as stating, “It’s really hard to take a higher price now for a lower price in
the future when the future is very far away”).
123. AndroGel, What is AndroGel?, http://www.androgel.com/aboutandrogel.html (last visited
May 7, 2010).
124. AndroGel, What is Low T?, http://www.androgel.com/about_lowt.html (last visited May
7, 2010).
125. Id.
126. First Amended Complaint, FTC v. Watson, No. CV 09-598 MRP (PLAx) ¶ 35 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 12, 2009).
127. Id. ¶ 36.
128. Id. ¶ 32.
129. Id. ¶ 39.
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ingredients.130 This patent expires in August 2020.131
In May 2003, generic firms Watson and Paddock filed Paragraph-IV
certifications challenging AndroGel.132 In August, Solvay sued each for
infringement, which triggered automatic stays of FDA approval of the
companies’ generic AndroGel versions until January 2006.133
In its complaint, the FTC included several grounds on which Solvay
might not be able to rely on its patent in preventing competition. First, the
generic products contained ingredients not covered by the patent.134
Second, the patent was invalid because of previous sales, because it was
obvious, and because it did not provide an adequate written description.135
Finally, the patent was unenforceable since, in its application, Solvay did
not disclose a relevant agreement to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).136 To keep its monopoly position, Solvay needed to prove
infringement by the generics and had to defeat each of these infringement
and unenforceability arguments.
In any event, AndroGel had played a central role in Solvay’s portfolio.
And the company projected that generic entry in mid-2006 would slash
AndroGel sales by 90% within one year, cutting its profits by $125 million
per year.137
At the same time, generic firms were poised to enter the market. In
January 2006, Watson received final FDA approval for its product.138
Watson predicted an entry date of January 2007, and ordered commercial
manufacturing equipment for intended use in late 2006.139 Paddock spent
$750,000, approximately three-quarters of its annual equipment budget, on
commercial manufacturing equipment.140
Solvay settled with Watson and Paddock, as well as Paddock’s
development partner Par. It agreed to pay Watson $19 million during the
first year of the deal—eventually rising to $30 million annually—for copromoting AndroGel to doctors.141 And for six years, Solvay agreed to pay
$10 million to Par for co-promotion and $2 million to Paddock for back-up
manufacturing.142
130. Id. ¶ 40. Solvay applied for the patent along with Belgian firm Besins Healthcare, S.A. In
1999, Solvay filed a New Drug Application for AndroGel with the FDA, which approved it in 2000.
Id. ¶ 34.
131. Id. ¶ 44. Solvay ultimately received an additional six months of “pediatric exclusivity”
that runs through February 2021. Id.
132. Id. ¶ 45.
133. Id. ¶ 48.
134. Id. ¶ 87.
135. Id. ¶ 88.
136. Id. ¶ 89.
137. Id. ¶ 50.
138. Id. ¶ 53.
139. Id. ¶ 56.
140. Id.
141. Id. ¶ 66.
142. Id. ¶ 74.
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B. Adding the Product-Hopping Dimension
Pursuant to the terms of the 2006 agreements, the generics agreed that
they would not enter the market before 2015. Such entry would occur five
years before patent expiration in 2020.
Solvay, however, was not planning to encounter robust generic
competition in 2015. Its strategy was to switch the market to a new version
of testosterone gel. AndroGel contains 1% testosterone.143 The new
product it was developing would contain 1.62% testosterone.144
Between 2006 and 2015, Solvay was guaranteed that its formulation
patent would not be challenged. With this luxury, it had sufficient time to
develop and market the new testosterone gel. Such a change could benefit
patients by allowing them to achieve results with less gel.145
Even more obviously, the new formulation would be a windfall to
Solvay. Such a switch would prevent automatic generic substitution.
Patients, in other words, could not substitute generic versions of the new
gel. There likely would be little demand for generic versions of AndroGel.
This strategy was a central aspect of the agreements with generics.
According to the FTC’s complaint, “Solvay told Watson of its plans for a
line extension product.”146 Watson accepted delay in its entering the
market until 2015 “even though a line extension product could have a
severe negative impact on its potential sales of generic AndroGel by
2015.”147 And Watson gained the right to co-promote not only AndroGel
but also any line extension product.148
In short, the generic entry date of 2015 might initially appear to be
procompetitive by providing a guaranteed additional five years of
competition. In the context of Solvay’s product-hopping strategy, however,
it seems far less favorable. For after product hopping, there will be little
demand for generic versions of AndroGel in 2015. By then, the market will
be switched to the new testosterone gel product.149
143. Id. ¶ 63.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. ¶ 66.
149. Another example is provided by Abbott’s TriCor, a cholesterol and triglycerides drug
with more than $1 billion in annual U.S. sales. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Abbott, Teva Reach Deal that
Delays Generic TriCor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527
48703300504574568262242442986.html (last visited June 20, 2010). With Tricor’s patent expiring
in 2011, Abbott pursued the product hopping/settlement combination to obtain every drop of profits
it could.
First, it developed the next-generation drug, TriLipix, for which it received FDA approval in
December 2008 and which it began marketing in January 2009. David Phillips, Abbott Labs’ Deal
with Teva Pharma Is ‘Phat News’ for Lipid-Lowering Franchise, BNET, Dec. 14, 2009, http://ind
ustry.bnet.com/pharma/10005711/abbott-labs-deal-with-teva-pharmaceuticals-is-phat-news-forlipid-lowering-franchise/ (last visited June 20, 2010); Abbott Laboratories, Q1 2009 Earnings Call
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V. THE MISSING DIMENSION
The exploration of the relationship between product hopping and
settlement leads to insights not previously appreciated. In doing so, it
recalls the parable of Flatland.
A. Flatland and Previous Analyses
The story of Flatland centers on a two-dimensional world in which
geometric shapes exist, unaware of other dimensions.150 Squares and lines
in Flatland observe only the flat slices of three-dimensional objects that
intersect with the plane. In the story, a square is able to leave Flatland and
discover a third dimension, thereby exposing the limitations of the twodimensional world.
These lessons are applicable to the intersection of product hopping and
settlements. Until now, the competitive effects of pharmaceutical
settlements have been analyzed on the plane of the single product that is
the subject of settlement.151 One central line of inquiry on this plane has
been the existence and analysis of reverse payments.
For example, courts, government agencies, and commentators have
examined the effects of settlement on generic firms’ entry for the particular
product covered by settlement. They have especially focused on reverse
payments that provide the brand firm with more protection than the patent
provides. For example, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division has
recently joined the FTC in advocating presumptive illegality for reverse
payments:
Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA, Apr. 17, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/131529-abbott-labor
atories-q1-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (last visited June 20, 2010). In mid-2009, Abbott
entered into a co-promotion agreement with AstraZeneca and “initiated a Trilipix branded consumer
awareness campaign” that increased patient use “across all channels.” Ben Comer, Abbott, AZ
Extend Co-promotion to Trilipix, MM&M, June 4, 2009, http://www.mmm-online.com/abbott-azextend-co-promotion-to-trilipix/article/138003/ (last visited June 20, 2010); Abbott Laboratories,
Q3 2009 Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKINGALPHA, Oct. 14, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/
166543-abbott-laboratories-q3-2009-earnings-call-transcript?page=-1 (last visited June 20, 2010).
Second, Abbott addressed the possibility of a generic version of TriCor by settling with Teva in
December 2009, preventing the generic from reaching the market until (at the earliest) March 2011.
Rockoff, supra.
150. EDWIN A. ABBOTT, FLATLAND 3–5 (Barnes & Noble Books 5th ed. 1884).
151. Before the 2003 Medicare amendments, settlements occurred on a patent-by-patent basis.
The amendments shifted the focus to a product-by-product basis. See 149 CONG. REC. 31780, 31783
(2003) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“The Hatch-Waxman provisions in this bill also make the
exclusivity available only with respect to the patent or patents challenged on the first day generic
applicants challenge brand drug patents, which makes the exclusivity a product-by-product
exclusivity rather than a patent-by-patent exclusivity.”).
Even this axis is more complicated than initially appears because of the malleable nature of the
expiration date of the last-expiring patent. C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust:
Using New Data and Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 638
(2009).
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• As far back as 2002, the FTC argued that “paying a
potential competitor to accept an entry date is a
payment not to compete and presumptively
anticompetitive.”152
• In 2009, the Division aligned with the FTC in
asserting that: “[T]he anticompetitive potential of
reverse payments . . . in exchange for the alleged
infringer’s agreement not to compete and to eschew
any challenge to the patent is sufficiently clear that
such agreements should be treated as presumptively
unlawful.”153
Many commentators have taken similar positions, again focusing on
reverse payments:
• Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley
contend that reverse payments should be
“presumptively unlawful” unless the payment “is no
more than the expected value of litigation and
collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”154
• Tom Cotter advances “a rule of presumptive invalidity
for all reverse-payment settlements.”155
• Carl Shapiro and Mark Lemley view patents as
“probabilistic property right[s,]”156 concluding that
settlements “cannot lead to lower expected consumer

152. Reply Brief of Counsel Supporting the Complaint at 25, In re Schering-Plough Corp.,
2003 WL 22989651, Part II.A (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003) (No. 9297), vacated by Schering-Plough Corp.
v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9297/0
21022rbocstc.pdf. Even before that, the FTC settled a reverse-payment case with Abbott
Laboratories and Geneva Pharmaceuticals in 2000 that had delayed generic alternatives to the
hypertension and prostate drug, Hytrin. Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Abbott Labs.,
No. 981-0395 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/abbottagreement.htm.
153. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 10, Ark. Carpenters
Health and Welfare Fund v. Bayer, AG, No. 05-2581-cv(L) (2d Cir. July 6, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Cipro Brief].
154. Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes,
87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759 (2003) (also requiring the patentee to show that “the ex ante
likelihood of prevailing in its infringement lawsuit is significant”).
155. Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse
Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1091 (2003).
156. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003).
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surplus than would arise from ongoing litigation”157
and that reverse payments in excess of avoided
litigation costs are “a clear signal that the settlement is
likely to be anticompetitive.”158
• Scott Hemphill suggests a “presumption of illegality”
if the settlement “restricts the generic firm’s ability to
market a competing drug” and also “includes
compensation from the innovator to the generic
firm.”159
• I have explained that “the appropriate default position
for reverse-payment settlements should be
presumptive illegality” and that a brand is likely to
gain exclusivity beyond that provided by the patent
“by supplementing the parties’ entry-date agreement
with a payment to the generic.”160
This focus on reverse payments makes sense in shining the spotlight on
the most concerning settlements. Large reverse payments are most likely to
raise red flags of potential patent invalidity, especially when generic firms
receive more through settlement than they would have gained from
entering the market. A focus on reverse payments is especially helpful
given antitrust courts’ inability to directly determine issues such as patent
validity and infringement.161 And the appropriate treatment of reverse
payments has deserved significant attention given courts’ overly excessive
deference to such settlements.
But this spotlight on the evils of reverse payments may unwittingly
absolve from condemnation agreements without reverse payments.
Recently, firms have entered into nuanced agreements by which brand
companies pay generic firms for IP licenses, the supply of raw materials or
finished products, and assistance in product promotion. They agree not to
launch authorized, brand-sponsored generics.162 And they promise, through
157. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 94 (2005).
158. Shapiro, supra note 156, at 407.
159. Hemphill, supra note 49, at 1561.
160. Carrier, supra note 4, at 76.
161. Id. at 73 (“Determining patent validity and infringement would require significant
analysis and testimony on complex issues such as patent claim interpretation and infringement
analysis” that “could take weeks [and] cannot be inserted as mini-trials within antitrust cases.”).
162. FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT
OF
2003:
SUMMARY
OF
AGREEMENTS
FILED
IN
FY 2007
2
(2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/05/mmaact.pdf; FTC BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT,
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settlement, that the generic firm can retain its 180 days of exclusivity.163
Though courts do not always recognize it, all of these arrangements convey
value to the generic firm.
B. Embracing the New Dimension
As this Article shows, the focus on reverse payments also misses
concerns associated with product hopping. In many cases, the relevant
framework within which the brand firm maneuvers is not the single
product that is the focus of settlement. Rather, it is the multiple products
implicated in the firm’s lifecycle strategy. As a result, the realities of the
pharmaceutical marketplace suggest an expansion of the relevant universe
to include the reformulated product.
Once the focus expands to consider the brand firm’s strategy, the
framework shifts. Initially, when centered on the single product that is the
subject of settlement, it resembles one in which 1) the brand firm maintains
its monopoly, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which
generic firms can enter the market, fostering competition.
Consideration of the product-hopping dimension shifts the framework
to one in which 1) the brand firm guarantees that its patent will not be
challenged, followed by 2) a period (before patent expiration) in which any
generic competition will mean little given the migration of patients to a
new product not subject to state drug product selection laws.
These two elements make up the core of the new dimension to the
product hopping–settlement combination.
1. Guaranteed Immunity from Challenge
The first prong emphasizes the period in which the generic firm agrees
not to challenge the patent. For starters, the promise threatens the goals of
the Hatch-Waxman Act, which encouraged patent challenges, as opposed
to agreements not to challenge patents. In particular, the exclusivity period
is reserved for the first ANDA to challenge a patent and seek entrance
before the end of the patent term.
The promise also is concerning given that empirical studies have
consistently shown that a significant percentage of granted patents are

AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: SUMMARY OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2005 4–5 (2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/04/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf.
163. Hemphill, supra note 151, at 651–53. This “retained exclusivity” is quite valuable to the
generic, which does not face the possibility of losing patent litigation and which gains much of its
profits during the period in which it is the only generic on the market. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, GENERIC COMPETITION AND DRUG PRICES (2006), http://www.fda.gov/AboutF
DA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucm129385.htm (last visited May 7, 2010) (noting that presence of one
generic on market leads to 6% price reduction, entry of second generic lowers price to
approximately half the brand price, and entry by six or more generic companies lowers the price to a
quarter of the brand price).
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invalid.164 As the Department of Justice explained in a recent brief:
“Allowing the patent holder to claim antitrust immunity for its contracts as
if they were litigated injunctions, while evading the risk of patent
invalidation, deprives consumers of significant benefits from price
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.”165
If the brand firm were not able to guarantee that its patent would be
immune from challenge, any switch to the new product would face the
hurdle of a patent challenge that could ultimately lead to invalidity. Such a
finding would thwart the strategy.
For in that case, the generic firm would be able to offer its version of
the patented drug, entering the market before the brand firm has the chance
to switch the market to its new product. And once the generic firm obtains
a foothold in the market, the product-hopping strategy is far less likely to
be successful.166
One reason is that any attempt to prime the market for the product hop
by increasing the price of the patented brand product would run headlong
into the cheaper generic product, to which patients naturally would turn. A
second reason is that any attempt by the brand firm to heavily market the
new drug would suffer through competition against a less expensive
generic version.
That is why the combination is so powerful. For it allows the brand firm
to methodically move to the new product at a time of its choosing. It need
not fear the state DPS laws. It need not fear that generic firms would
compete with its reformulated product. It need not fear that such
competition would make the new product less attractive.
As discussed above, product hopping is most successful when brand
firms can prevent generic entry until after they can switch the market to the
new product. During this period, brand firms trumpet the virtues of the new
product, ignore the old product, and avoid generic competition. As
Cephalon could confidently assure investors as a result of the strategy:
“[T]here is nobody else in this space at this time.”167
2. Lack of Meaningful Competition After Generic Entry
The second prong of the strategy is a lack of meaningful competition
after generic entry. One factor on which courts and commentators have
focused in analyzing settlements is the date of generic entry in relation to
the time remaining in the patent term. Even a recently introduced Senate
bill includes, in determining the validity of agreements, the factor of “the
164. Carrier, supra note 4, at 64–65 (citing studies finding that courts invalidated at least 43%
of patents and that an FTC study of Paragraph IV challenges in the 1990s showed that the generic
prevailed in 73% of the cases).
165. U.S. Cipro Brief, supra note 153, at 16–17.
166. See supra Part II.B.4.
167. Cephalon Q1 2009 transcript, supra note 100.
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length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent,
compared with the agreed upon entry date for the ANDA product.”168
At the risk of oversimplifying, generic entry several years before the
end of the patent term is generally viewed as procompetitive because it
introduces generic competition in a setting in which the brand firm could
have exercised monopoly power until the end of the patent term.
Focusing on the product-hopping dimension, however, reveals that this
period is entitled to less deference than might initially appear. For once the
brand firm shifts the market to the reformulated product, often after raising
the price of the old product and employing its heavy marketing artillery on
behalf of the new product, generic competition will not play a meaningful
role in the industry.
One central reason is that generic firms cannot take advantage of state
DPS laws. These laws allow—or even require—pharmacists to substitute
generic versions of brand drugs. But switching the market to new products
prevents generic firms from quickly demonstrating the equivalency
necessary to take advantage of the laws.
As discussed above, the concern when a brand reformulates its drug is
that the generic version of the first product is not bioequivalent to the
second product. And the generic firm typically will not be able to show
bioequivalence for years, until it reformulates the product, receives FDA
approval, and concludes patent litigation.
As a result, the generic firm must play catch-up in developing versions
of the reformulated product. Just one example was provided in the TriCor
case, in which Abbott switched to new formulations on several occasions,
buying time to avoid competition and “prevent[ing] pharmacies from
filling TriCor prescriptions with a generic capsule formulation.”169
The second reason that generic firms cannot offer meaningful
competition is that the brand firm switches the market to the reformulated
product before generic entry. Absent settlement, there is a chance that
generic firms could successfully challenge the brand firm’s patent by
showing that it is invalid or that its product does not infringe the patent.
Either of these conclusions would allow immediate generic entry. As a
result, pharmacists could offer, and patients purchase, generics at a time
before the brand firm is able to switch the market to the reformulated
product. In other words, the brand will have lost the critical advantage of
timing.
In that case, brand firms will not be able to offer the “uncontested
message” of the new product’s superiority with detailers praising only the

168. Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 28(b)(1), (2009),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=
f:s369rs.txt.pdf.
169. Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 416 (D. Del. 2006).
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new product.170 Nor could they avoid generic alternatives. Brand firms
view a launch after generic entry as a “[t]otal [d]isaster.”171 Any
reformulation would garner dramatically lower revenues and would suffer
as products are “forever lost to the generics.”172
For example, in the TriCor case, brand firm Abbott predicted that if it
launched its reformulated version before generic entry, it would enjoy sales
of 269 million Euros, far more than the 15 million Euros it would receive if
the reformulation did not reach the market before the generic.173
In short, even if settlement allows formal generic entry before the end
of the patent term, the appropriate timeframe should be considered not just
in the context of the patent at the heart of settlement but also in light of the
brand firm’s product-hopping strategy. Through this lens, pre-expiration
settlements appear far less favorable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two activities central to brand drug firm strategies in the early 21st
century are settlements and product hopping. To date, courts and
commentators have separately considered these activities. But an analysis
of the combination of the two strategies uncovers anticompetitive concern
that might otherwise evade scrutiny.
In particular, settlements that allow generic entry before the end of the
patent term are often trumpeted as offering procompetitive virtues in
introducing competition before patent expiration.
But a real-world analysis of product hopping shows that any such
competition is often illusory. In many cases, by the time the generic enters
the market, the brand will have switched the market to the new product. In
fact, the timing of the reformulated product is a vital factor in determining
the success of product hopping. Brand firms are far more likely to succeed
if they can forestall generic entry until after they introduce the new
product. Of course, by this time, generic versions of the older product do
not offer effective competition.
In short, courts determining the appropriate antitrust treatment of
settlements should pay attention to the silent, but brutally effective,
dimension of product hopping.

170.
171.
172.
173.

Leffler et al., supra note 32 (manuscript at 50).
Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, ¶ 1028.
Shadowen et al., supra note 63.
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